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NOTES
PREEMPTING INDIAN PREEMPTION: COTTON
PETROLEUM CORP. V NEW MEXICO
The indigenous peoples' of North America maintained sovereign political
and legal institutions well before the Europeans discovered and conquered
them. 2 Integrating these peoples, and their institutions, into the system of
constitutional federalism that their conquerers eventually developed has
proven problematic from the earliest days of European rule.' Policies toward the Indians have ranged from "benign neglect," 4 to attempted geno1. This Note refers to the aboriginal inhabitants of North America and their descendants
by their common English language designations: as Indians generally and by the English language names of the tribes specifically. Some of these English tribal names are approximate
translations of the tribes' own self-identifying terms (e.g., Blackfeet, Crow). Other English
names were given by other persons, often historical enemies, and may be considered offensive
by some tribal members (e.g., Navajo, Apache, Sioux). Because the general reader is not familiar with the more appropriate term, this Note employs the conventional names. These terms,
including Indian, the use of which is not uncontroversial, are used with care.
2. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 159 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978).
3. See Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope and Limitations, 132 U.
PA. L. REV. 195, 200-05 (1984); see also Williams, The Algebra of FederalIndian Law: The
Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986
Wis. L. REV. 219. The Williams article presents an interesting perspective on preconstitutional relations between Europeans and non-Europeans and how these early relations helped
shape the current interactions between the United States and Indian tribes.
Other constitutional federal systems in North America have encountered many of the same
difficulties in the integration of Indians. The issues that Canada confronted in integrating
Indians into its system bear special similarity, particularly given the English common law
heritage in Canada. Because of this heritage, and because Canada's constitutional history
largely postdates that of the United States, Canadian law regarding Indians tends to track
developments in the United States. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada frequently
analyzes United States Supreme Court decisions before reaching its own decision. Johnston, A
Theory of Crown Trust Towards Aboriginal Peoples, 18 OTTAWA L. REV. 307, 318 (1986).
However, there are considerable differences between decisions reached by the two high
courts. This deviation results from different constitutional and statutory frameworks as well as
from different historical experiences. Nonetheless, examination of Canadian law may prove
somewhat illuminating, particularly when the Canadian Supreme Court or Parliament has
acted with the United States' example in mind. Consequently, this Note will occasionally
make reference to Canadian law as it relates to the point under discussion.
4. This terminology gained currency from Patrick Moynihan's 1970 memorandum to
President Nixon as a recommendation for national policy towards the African-American family. N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1985, § 1,at 1, col. 2, and at 15, col. 1. The phrase aptly describes the
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cide,' to forced assimilation into the majority culture. 6 The United States
Constitution is largely silent with respect to Indian political or legal institutions. Only two references to Indians exist in the Constitution: the commerce clause, 7 which addresses the distribution of power between the State
and Federal Governments to regulate trade with the Indian tribes; and article II, section 2, which contemplates the exclusion of Indians "not taxed"
from the apportionment of congressional representatives. 8 Yet, Indian institutions continue to exist, in varying forms, with varying levels of success.
persistent inattentiveness of American society with regard to Indian affairs. See generally V.
DELORIA, CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS: AN INDIAN MANIFESTO 12-13 (1969) (stating that

the Federal Government typically responds to Indian problems by appointing, but subsequently ignoring, a task force). The Nixon administration did not apply such a policy in Indian country. Rather, it carried out an activist Indian program. See President Nixon's
Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, reprintedin 1974 PUB. PAPERS 56,
75-76 (1975). Indeed, many Indian leaders remember the Nixon Presidency as the most progressive and sympathetic Administration in the last several decades. Cohen, TribalEnterprise,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1989, at 33.
5. While murder may have never been the official policy of the United States, General
Sheridan's often quoted remark that the only "good" Indian is a dead Indian undoubtedly
reflected the attitude of many persons both in and out of government. See E. CONNELL, SON
OF THE MORNING STAR 179-80 (1984) (similar remark attributed to Territorial Delegate

James Cavanaugh (D-Mont.)).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 57-60.
7. "Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
8. Id. § 2, cl. 3. The first sentence of this clause reads as follows:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers,
which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including
those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three
fifths of all other Persons.
Id. The effect of this sentence was altered by section 2 of the fourteenth amendment, which
reads: "Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not
taxed." Id. amend. XIV, § 2.
Indians have been citizens of the United States since 1924. Citizenship Act of 1924, Pub. L.
No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1988)). As citizens,
Indians are entitled to vote in national elections. Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833, 839 (8th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976). However, Indians "not taxed" are excluded from the
population for purposes of congressional apportionment. 2 U.S.C. § 2a (1988) (language identical to section 2 of the fourteenth amendment). Whether all Indians are counted toward
apportionment may turn on whether the word "taxed" refers to the actual payment of taxes.
If so, there could conceivably be a number of exclusions. The phrase "not taxed" may mean
merely that those Indians are not liable for federal income taxation. If this interpretation is
correct, then all Indians would be included in calculations of congressional apportionment,
because all Indians are subject to federal income taxation. Superintendent of Five Civilized
Tribes v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 418, 421 (1935). The clause also may refer to state rather
than federal taxes, in which case the broad coverage of the Internal Revenue Code is irrelevant. Congress and the courts have not settled the exact meaning of the words "not taxed."
Indeed, the Attorney General of the United States found the problem perplexing, and declined
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Preempting Indian Preemption

While the legal and political supremacy of the Federal Government over
tribal governments has been long established, often as a result of military
supremacy, the relationship between the tribal governments and the governments of the states within which the tribes are located has presented a more
complex set of issues. 9 Indeed, competition between the states and tribes to
exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians within reservations is heated. " In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has decided cases concerning
conflicting assertions of state and tribal jurisdiction over various activities of
non-Indians within reservations, including criminal offenses," hunting and
fishing,' 2 property development, 13 and taxation. " Considering the relative
abundance of energy-producing natural resources located on reservations, 15
it is not surprising that in recent years competition over the right to tax
energy development and extraction has frequently found its way into the
courts.

In Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 6 the United States Supreme
Court considered whether the United States Constitution permits a state to
collect severance taxes from a non-Indian corporation that produces oil on
to render an opinion. 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 518, 519-20 (1940). In any event, the Census Bureau
counts all Indians and makes no attempt to differentiate between those who have and have not
paid federal or state taxes, or between those who are and are not subject to state taxation.
Telephone interview with Pat Heelen, Deputy Counsel for the Census Bureau (Oct. 27, 1989).
9. One facet of the relationship, however, is well settled: "[T]ribal sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal Government, not the States." Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980).
10. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian
Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979, 985 n.24 (1981). However, the interests of states and tribes are not completely mutually exclusive. See Note, Crow Tribe v. Montana: New Limits on State Intrusion into Reservation Rights, New Lessons for State and Tribal
Cooperation, 50 MONT. L. REV. 133, 163 (1989) (noting that states and tribes share an interest
in protecting high coal taxes from congressional preemption).
11. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (holding that
tribal courts do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians).
12. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981) (holding that the state
may regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on non-Indian fee land within a reservation).
13. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S.
Ct. 2994, 3009 (1989) (holding that a county may zone property within a reservation when the
zoning does not threaten the tribe's political integrity).
14. See, e.g., Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 845
(1982) (holding that the state may not tax gross receipts earned by a non-Indian contractor in
constructing school buildings on a reservation).
15. It has been estimated that tribes own approximately fifty percent of the nation's privately owned uranium, approximately thirty-three percent of the Western coal, and approximately four percent of the oil in the United States. J. HARLAN, AMERICAN INDIANS TODAY

56-57 (1987).
16. 109 S.Ct. 1698 (1989).
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an Indian reservation.' 7 Cotton Petroleum Corporation (Cotton) operates

approximately sixty-five oil wells on reservation land leased from the Jicarilla Apache Tribe,18 pursuant to the federal Indian Mineral Leasing Act
of 1938 (1938 Act).1 9 The Jicarilla Apache Tribe collects from Cotton severance taxes on oil produced on the reservation 2" as well as rental fees and
royalties. 2' In addition, the State of New Mexico levies five separate taxes
on Cotton that amount to approximately eight percent of total production
value.2 2
Cotton unsuccessfully challenged the Jicarilla Apache Tribe's right to collect severance taxes on oil production.2 a The corporation subsequently paid
state severance taxes under protest and brought an action in state court challenging the state's right to levy taxes.2 4 Cotton protested the imposition of
state severance taxes on several federal constitutional grounds: the Indian
commerce clause, the interstate commerce clause, the due process clause,
and the supremacy clause. 25 The lower court upheld the state's jurisdiction
to tax Cotton's oil production, and the New Mexico Court of Appeals af27
firmed. 26 After the New Mexico Supreme Court denied review of the case,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.28
17. Id.at 1702.
18. Id.at 1703. The reservation encompasses 742,135 acres. Id. at 1702. The Jicarilla
Apache Tribe has approximately 2,500 members. Id.
19. Act of May 11, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-506, 52 Stat. 347 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1982)).
20. J.A.T.C. §§ 11-1-1 to -15 (Equity 1987). The United States Secretary of Interior,
through the Acting Area Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, approved the tax ordinance
in 1976. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 539 (10th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 455 U.S.
130 (1982).
21. The Jicarilla Apache Tribe collects a royalty of 12.5%. Cotton, 109 S.Ct. at 1703.
Cotton also pays the assignor of the leases a royalty of 12.5%. Id. at 1703 n.3.
22. Id. at 1703 n.4. See also N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-29-1 to -8, 7-30-1 to -14, 7-31-1 to 11, 7-32-1 to -15, 7-34-1 to -9 (1986).
23. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 159 (1982). The Cotton Court suggested that the dispute before it arose due.to a footnote in Merrion. Cotton, 109 S.Ct. at 1703.
Justice Stevens, author of the Court's opinion in Cotton, strongly dissented in Merrion. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 190 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24. Cotton, 109 S.Ct. at 1704.
25. Id.
26. Cotton Petroleum v. State, 106 N.M. 517, 522, 745 P.2d 1170, 1175 (Ct. App.), cert.
quashed, 106 N.M. 511, 745 P.2d 1159 (1987), aff'd, 109 S.Ct. 1698 (1989).
27. Cotton Petroleum v. State, 106 N.M. 511, 745 P.2d 1159 (1987).
28. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 485 U.S. 1005 (1988). The Court invited the
parties to brief an additional question: " 'Does the [c]ommerce (c]lause require that an Indian
Tribe be treated as a [s]tate for purposes of determining whether a state tax on nontribal
activities conducted on an Indian Reservation must be apportioned to account for taxes imposed on those same activities by the Indian Tribe?' " Id. The Court answered this question in
the negative. Cotton, 109 S.Ct. at 1716.
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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the New Mexico Court of
Appeals, rejecting each of Cotton's constitutional claims. 2 9 Writing for the
majority, Justice Stevens determined that neither the Indian commerce
clause nor the interstate commerce clause barred the state taxes.3 ° Furthermore, the Court asserted that an imperfect fit between a state's taxation of a
particular taxpayer and a state's provision of services to that taxpayer does
not violate the due process clause.3 1 Moreover, the Court rejected Cotton's
supremacy clause argument based on its determination that there was no
evidence of congressional intent to create an exemption from state taxation
for Cotton. 32 Rather than holding that one tax preempted another, the
Supreme Court concluded that the state and the Jicarilla Apache Tribe have
concurrent taxation jurisdiction in this case.33 Consequently, Cotton must
pay taxes to both the state and the tribe.34
Justice Blackmun, writing for the dissent,3 5 focused exclusively on the
supremacy clause issue.3 6 The dissent challenged the majority's reasoning as
contradicting a recent Supreme Court decision,37 which held that Congress
intended that the 1938 Act guarantee Indians the maximum return for their
natural wealth.38 Therefore, because the New Mexico taxes interfered with
this goal, the state was preempted from collecting the taxes. 39 Justice Blackmun analyzed the legislative history of the 1938 Act in its historical context
and determined that the Court's earlier contradictory decision provided a
better interpretation of the 1938 Act.' ° Even without the statutory evidence,
however, the dissent found sufficient justification in the Court's recent prior
holdings on Indian preemption to conclude that New Mexico could not collect taxes for oil produced on an Indian reservation. 4 m
29. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1713-16. The Court was divided six to three; Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy joined Justice Stevens, who wrote
the majority opinion for the Court. Id. at 1702. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined Justice
Blackmun, who filed a dissenting opinion. Id.

30. Id. at 1716.
31. Id. at 1715.
32. Id. at 1713.
33. Id. at 1714.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 1716 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
36. However, in a footnote, the dissent agreed with the Court's conclusion that the interstate commerce clause did not apply to the facts of this case. Id. at 1716-17 n.1.
37. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759 (1985). See infra notes 168-75

and accompanying text.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Blackfeet, 471 U.S. at 767 n.5.
Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1717-18.
Id. at 1717-21.
Id. at 1726.
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This Note briefly examines the concept of tribal sovereignty as it affects
state jurisdiction. Next, it discusses the definition and evolution of the doctrine of Indian preemption. It then examines the preemption cases that involve the 1938 Act. Further, this Note analyzes the decision in Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, its impact on the doctrine of Indian preemption, and its impact on Indian tribes. This Note concludes that the present
statutory structure provides for sovereign, federally dependent, Indian governments. However, while applying the form but not the substance of Indian preemption analysis, the Cotton Court erroneously failed to calculate
the clearly predictable impact these taxes will have on the Jicarilla Apache
Tribe and thereby reached a result that will create serious negative consequences on Indian economic life.
I.

TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: AT THE SUFFERANCE OF CONGRESS

A.

The Early Years: John Marshall's Wall

The United States Supreme Court determined early that Indian tribes
were not "foreign States" within the meaning of the Constitution, when in
1831 it rejected the assertion that the Court had original jurisdiction to hear
a dispute between a tribe and a State.42 The Court subsequently rendered its
first conclusive determination of the relative jurisdictions of states and Indian tribes in Worcester v. Georgia.4 3 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
John Marshall concluded that the Constitution assigned to the Federal Government the exclusive authority to conduct relations with Indian tribes.'
Consequently, this exclusivity barred application of any state law over In42. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). The Cherokee Nation tribe
asserted original jurisdiction on the basis of article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution. Id. at 11. Article III, section 2 grants the federal courts jurisdiction in cases "between a
State... and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects" and grants the United States Supreme Court
original jurisdiction to hear cases "in which a State shall be a Party." U.S. CONsT. art. III,
§ 2, cls. 1, 2.
43. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
44. Id. at 559-61. Federal authority over Indians granted by the Constitution, which is
greater than federal power over Indians conferred by the Articles of Confederation, is tantamount to federal succession to the power of the British Crown, asserted in the Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763. See Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 F.2d 612, 615-16 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981). By this Proclamation, made eight months after the
end of the Seven Years' (French and Indian) War, the Crown forbade alienation of Indian
lands to private parties and regulated trade with the Indians. Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763, reprintedin CAN. REV. STAT. App. II, No. 1 (1985).
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dian tribes,4" creating a jurisdictional "wall" between the States and the Indian tribes.46
The Court could have reached the same result under an inherent tribal
sovereignty theory.4 7 However, by finding that the Constitution controlled,
thus barring state jurisdiction, the Court effectively decreed that the tribes'
political and legal posture henceforth would be defined exclusively by the
Federal Government.48 Although the United States continued the colonial
practice of signing treaties with the tribes as though they were foreign nations, the relationship between the tribes and the United States indeed "resemble[d] that of a ward to [its] guardian." 4 9
The concept of Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations" ° that conducted relations with the United States largely by treaty prevailed until the
post-Civil War Reconstruction period. 5 In 1871, the United States House
of Representatives, which previously had been largely excluded from direct
involvement in Indian relations,52 attached a rider to an appropriations bill
mandating that the United States would no longer enter into treaties with
45. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561 ("The Cherokee nation ... is a distinct community
• . . in which the laws of Georgia can have no force."). Cf CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 1-5, § 88

(1985) (all provincial laws apply on Indian reserves unless specifically contradicted by federal
statute).
46. Note, Indian Sovereignty: Confusion Prevails-Californiav. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians, 107 S. Ct. 1083 (1987), 63 WASH. L. REV. 169, 170 (1988).
47. The Court could have chosen to exclude the tribes, as sovereign entities, from the
federal structure outlined by the Constitution, a reading that is not inconsistent with the document itself, or with the lack of tribal ratification of the Constitution. Consequently, the Court
could have found that state laws are no more applicable within the Indian territories than they
are within Canada, Mexico, or the District of Columbia. See generally Ball, Constitution,
Courts, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 3.
48. Tribal sovereignty is "at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance." United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). Lord Mansfield stated the common law analogue of this policy in Campbell v. Hall, 1 Cowp. 204, 209, Lofft 665, 741, 98 Eng.
Rep. 1045, 1047 (K.B. 1774) (ruling that the laws of a conquered country continue in effect
until altered by the conqueror).
49. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
50. Id.
51. Near contemporaneity and similarity in goals evidence a relationship between the Reconstruction and Allotment periods. Both eras were defined by policies that attempted to
assimilate racial minorities into American society. Recent historical scholarship on Reconstruction allows reexamination of the relationship between the policies. See, e.g., E. FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (1988) (comparing
the policies underlying Reconstruction with the concurrent actions taken by Congress).
52. The executive branch, usually the War Department, negotiated the treaties and submitted them to the Senate for ratification. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Constitution
restricted the role of the House of Representatives to appropriating money to cover commitments made in the treaties. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 201-03 (1975).
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the tribes.53 Subsequently, all Indian relations were conducted by acts of
Congress or Executive orders rather than by treaty.54 While the acts or orders were sometimes based upon agreements negotiated with the tribes, 55
neither Congress nor the President was required to obtain the consent of the
tribes, the practice of which had been at least a nominal part of a treaty
making regime.56 As a result, the Indians' legal and political status became
more clearly a function of federal authority.
An important result of this policy change was that congressional intent in
enacting specific pieces of legislation became determinative of the scope and
structure of Indian institutions to an extent not conceivable under the prior
treaty system. The intent of Congress, central to the issue of tribal-state
relations, and demonstrated by the General Allotment (Dawes) Act of
53. The rider stated: "[N]o Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States
shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the
United States may contract by treaty." Act of March 3, 1871, 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1982).
54. Often, the President acted to reserve from the public domain specific lands that the
War Department hoped to transfer to a tribe. See, e.g., Exec. Order of July 5, 1873, reprinted
in 1 C. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS, LAWS AND TREATIES 855-56 (1904) (temporarily reserving lands for the Gros Ventre, Piegan, and other tribes, pending negotiations).
55. See, e.g., Act of April 27, 1904, Pub. L. No. 58-183, 33 Stat. 352 (ratifying an agreement made with the Crow Tribe).
56. Congress' power over tribes is plenary, that is, without subject matter limitation. Laurence, Learningto Live With the PlenaryPower of Congress Over the Indian Nations: An Essay
in Reaction to Professor Williams' Algebra, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 418 (1988). See also Williams, LearningNot to Live With EurocentricMyopia: A Reply to ProfessorLaurence's Learning to Live With the Plenary Power of Congress Over the Indian Nations, 30 ARIZ. L. REV.
439, 445-46 (1988); Laurence, On EurocentricMyopia, The DesignatedHitter Rule and "The
Actual State of Things," 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 459 (1988). Residents of the District of Columbia
also have learned to live with Congress' plenary power. As one might expect, the relationship
between Congress and District residents is not always harmonious. See, e.g., supra, SPECIAL
ISSUE. District of Columbia: The "State" of Controversy.
Congress' plenary power over Indian tribes includes the right to unilaterally abrogate treaties. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564 (1903). Of course, constitutional limitations
apply to Congress. For example, Congress may not take tribal property without just compensation. Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 496-97 (1937). See also
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 407-15 (1980).
Under Canadian law, the Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763 has been termed an "Indian Bill of Rights." St. Catherines Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen, 13 S.C.R. 577, 652
(Can. 1887) (Gwynne, J., dissenting), aff'd, 14 App. Cas. 46, 60 L.T.R. 197 (P.C. 1888). See
generally Pentney, The Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada and the Constitution Act
1982: Part I - The Interpretive Prism of Section 25, 22 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 21 (1988).
Under Canadian law, treaties are considered analogous to contracts. See Attorney-General for
Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario, 1897 App. Cas. 199, 213 (P.C.); see also Regina v.
Sikyea, 46 W.W.R. 65, 69, 43 D.L.R.2d 150, 154, 43 C.R. 83, 87, [1964] 2 C.C.C. 325, 330
(N.W.T.C.A.) (analogy to contract principles extended to include promises other than for payments for land and the possibility of breach by the government), aff'd, 1964 S.C.R. 642.
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1887," called for assimilation of the Indians, as individuals, into American
life. The Dawes Act contemplated that when such assimilation occurred,
Indians would be brought totally under state jurisdiction,5 8 with all residual
sovereignty as well as the entire system of federal "guardianship" fading
away. 9 Similarly, during this same period, the Supreme Court allowed
6
states to exercise some jurisdiction over non-Indians on reservations. 0
Thus, Congress and the Court breached the jurisdictional "wall" between
the states and the tribes.
B.

Tribal Sovereignty Recaptured: The Indian ReorganizationAct

The progressive dismantling of Indian cultural,6 1 political, and legal institutions continued from the 1880's into the 1930's. Spurred by a strong reform movement, 62 Congress passed the Indian Reorganization (WheelerHoward) Act of 1934 (IRA).6 3 Passed for the purpose of extending to the
tribes "the fundamental rights of political liberty and local self-government,"' the IRA provided a mechanism for tribal promulgation of, and
federal approval of, constitutions for participating tribes.6 5
57. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341,
342, 348, 349, 354, 381 (1982)).
58. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1982).
59. Numerous commentators have analyzed extensively the history of the General Allotment Act. See, e.g., F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 130-43 (R. Strickland
& C. Wilkinson ed. 1982) [hereinafter F. COHEN]; see also D. OTIs, HISTORY OF THE ALLOT-

MENT POLICY, reprintedin Readjustment of Indian Affairs: Hearings on HR. 7902 Before the
House Committee on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 428-40 (1934).
60. See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 247 (1896) (holding that state courts
rather than federal courts have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians within reservations);
Utah & N. Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28, 31-32 (1885) (holding that a territory may levy a
property tax on non-Indian fee land within a reservation); Langford v. Monteith, 102 U.S. 145,
147 (1880) (stating that a state's civil jurisdiction may extend over non-Indians within a reservation unless expressly prohibited by treaty).
61. See F. COHEN, supra note 59, at 140 n.126 (describing the role of federal boarding
schools in repressing all aspects of Indian culture).
62. See K.R. PHILP, JOHN COLLIER'S CRUSADE FOR INDIAN REFORM 1920-1954, at 114-

18, 154-58 (1977). John Collier, an ardent reformer, was appointed Commissioner of Indian
Affairs by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933. F. COHEN, supra note 59, at 146.
63. Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479
(1982)).
64. S.REP. No. 1080, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934) (letter from President Roosevelt).
The pre-IRA political condition of Indian reservations had been characterized as "an extraordinary example of political absolutism in the midst of a free democracy ... which has
used methods of repression and suppression unparallelled in the modem world outside of
Czarist Russia and the Belgian Congo." 78 CONG. REC. 11,729 (1934) (statement of Rep.
Howard, cosponsor of the IRA).
65. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1982). Of the 258 tribes that held elections within the prescribed
period, only 77 rejected reorganization under the IRA. Comment, Tribal Self-Government
and the Indian ReorganizationAct of 1934, 70 MICH. L. REV. 955, 972 (1972).
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While integration of Indians into American society remained the ultimate
goal, the IRA focused on the tribe as a governmental unit, rather than on
individual Indians.6 6 Indians assimilated pursuant to the IRA were allowed
to retain their tribal identities and governments. 67 In addition, Congress enacted other laws intended to help the reorganized tribal societies achieve
economic self-sufficiency. 6 These additional enactments, including the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938,69 comprised vital components of the IRA
self-sufficiency program.7 °
By explicitly rejecting allotment and dissolution of the tribes as entities,7 1
the IRA represented a retreat from the assumption that Indians eventually
would be brought completely under state jurisdiction. While the IRA has
been very controversial among both Indians and non-Indians, 72 and
although Congress temporarily abandoned the concept of the IRA during
the ill-fated termination experiment, 7 3 it continues today to provide the definitive framework for tribal sovereignty.74
66. F. COHEN, supra note 59, at 147.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 1, 1937, 25 U.S.C. §§ 500-500n (1982) (federal acquisition, organization, and management of reindeer industry); Act of Aug. 27, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-355,
49 Stat. 891 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 305a-305c (1982) (federal promotion of
Indian arts and crafts industry).
69. Act of May 11, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-506, 52 Stat. 347 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1982)).
70. F. COHEN, supra note 59, at 152.
71. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461, 463(a) (1982); see also Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 496 (1973).
72. See Comment, supra note 65, at 972-79.
73. Congress' termination policy, adopted in the early 1950's, sought the abolition of tribal governments and the end of the special relationship between the Federal Government and
the tribes. Fourteen tribes were terminated before the experiment was abandoned in 1962. See
generally Note, Terminating the Indian Termination Policy, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1181 (1983)
(describing the immediate and long term adverse effects of the termination policy on Indian
culture, autonomy, and self-sufficiency).
74. It is not self-evident that the encouragement of separate political and legal structures
for Indians, alone among minorities in the United States, is the correct policy alternative. A
contrary body of opinion exists that finds the policy of self-determination a fight against the
tide of history. See, e.g., Martone, American Indian Tribal Self-Government in the Federal
System: Inherent Right or Congressional License?, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 600, 634 (1975)
(concluding that "reality is that the tribe cannot be separate, if only because historical forces
and the Indian's... partial integration are irreversible"). The controversy is not new; as early
as 1824, J.B. Robinson, then-Attorney-General for Upper Canada, stated "'To talk of [making] treaties with . . . Indians, residing in the heart of one of the most populous districts of
[Ontario], . . . is much the same ... as to talk of making a treaty of alliance with the Jews in
Duke street or with the French emigrants who have settled in England.' " Sero v. Gault, 50
O.L.R. 27, 31-32, 64 D.L.R. 327, 330 (1921). The same argument can be made today concerning Indians in the United States.
Whether self-determination is the correct model is a question that Congress must decide,
and the IRA is the current approach. Congress reiterated its commitment to self-determina-
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II.

INDIAN PREEMPTION DOCTRINE

In contrast to the periodic changes in the nature of tribal sovereignty, the
notion that absent congressional grant, state law has no force over Indians in
Indian territory has remained since the 1830's. 7" Because Indian land is actually "owned" by the United States7 6 and is held in trust77 for the tribes,
the Federal Government's general immunity from state taxation precludes
the imposition of state property taxes on Indian land. 78 However, state taxation of non-Indian interests located on reservations raises more problems.
At one time, the Court extended the tribes' taxation immunity to include
non-Indians. 79 After the Court subsequently rejected this approach," the
doctrine of preemption evolved as a bar to state taxation of non-Indian economic relations with tribes.
A. Preemption Defined
In 1965, the Supreme Court's decision in Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission8 1 introduced Indian preemption as a doctrine distinct
from other supremacy clause preemption doctrines. Indian preemption differs from other preemption primarily because of the unique, somewhat fidution recently with the Indian Self-Determination and Education Act of 1975. 25 U.S.C.
§§ 450, 450a (1982).
75. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220-21 (1959).
76. The Supreme Court first recognized the United States' title to Indian land in Johnson
v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 603 (1823). Chief Justice Marshall based his conclusion
on the "doctrine of discovery," although he acknowledged the Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763 as an alternative basis for decision. Id. at 594-95, 597. See also Newton, supra note 3,
at 208 n.69; see Guerin v. The Queen, 1984 2 S.C.R. 335, 376-78, 13 D.L.R.4th 321, 335-36,
1984 6 W.W.R. 481, 496 (Can.). The Supreme Court of Canada explored the United States
Supreme Court's holdings concerning the nature of the Indian ownership interest in these
lands in its landmark aboriginal title case Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia,
1973 S.C.R. 313, 339-44, 34 D.L.R.3d 145, 164-68, [1973] 4 W.W.R. 1, 19-24 (Can.) (opinion
of Judson, J.).
77. See Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27
STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1213-14 (1975); see also Johnston, A Theory of Crown Trust Towards
AboriginalPeoples, 18 OTTAWA L. REV. 307, 317-28 (1986); Comment, The Trust Doctrine: A
Source of Protectionfor Native American Sacred Sites, 38 CATH. U.L. REV. 705, 724-26 (1989).
78. See, e.g., The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 How.) 761 (1867); The Kansas Indians,
72 U.S. (5 How.) 737, 755 (1867). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1982) (congressional grant of
civil jurisdiction over Indian country to states does not include right to tax trust property);
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 390 (1976) (states lack jurisdiction to tax reservation
Indian's personal property absent congressional consent); cf CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 1-5, § 87
(1985) (Indian tax exemptions).
79. Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501, 506 (1922), overruled, Helvering v. Mountain
Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938).
80. Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376, 387 (1938).
81. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
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ciary, relationship between the distinctly sovereign Indian tribes and the
Federal Government.8 2 The difference results from the rule that courts construe federal statutes generously in the Indians' favor, therefore, preemption
is not limited to express congressional action.8 3 In contrast, when the Court
does not employ the generous statutory construction afforded to Indians, it
presumes that state law is not preempted" 'unless [such preemption] was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' ,84
In Warren Trading Post, the State of Arizona levied a two percent tax on
the gross proceeds of sales of a non-Indian retail trader operating on the
Navajo Reservation.8 5 The trader, acting pursuant to federal statute, 86 obtained a license from the Federal Government, permitting him to conduct
business on the reservation. 8 7 In a unanimous decision, the Court found
that the several federal statutes concerning trade with the Indians 8 precluded any state role in regulating Indian trade.89 In addition, the Court
determined that the tax might impose a financial burden on either the retailer or the Indian customers, and that the tax "could thereby disturb and
disarrange the statutory plan Congress set up in order to protect Indians." 9°
For this reason, the Court found that the state was without the power to tax
the trader for "sales made to reservation Indians on the reservation." 9 ' The
Court did not base this finding on the fact that the Indian reservation was
federally owned. 92 Rather, the Court focused on the existence of a federal
regulatory structure and recognized that the tax would have a substantial
economic impact on Indian economic life.93
The Court articulated the modern preemption doctrine eight years later in
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission. 94 In McClanahan, the State
of Arizona imposed an income tax on a reservation Indian who derived all of
her income from reservation sources.95 The Arizona Court of Appeals up82. F. COHEN, supra note 59, at 273.
83. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980).
84. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981) (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,
430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).

85. Warren Trading Post, 380 U.S. at 685.
86. 25 U.S.C. § 264 (1982). The Federal Government required licenses for Indian traders
since the first Congress. See Act of July 22, 1790, 1 Stat. 137.
87. Warren Trading Post, 380 U.S. at 686.
88. Id.at 688 n.7.
89. Id. at 691.
90. Id.
91. Id.at 691-92.
92. Id.at 691 n.18.
93. Id.at 691. The Court apparently did not require petitioner to show actual injury to
either the federal regulatory scheme or the tribal economy as a result of this tax.
94. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
95. Id.at 166. The amount in the controversy was $16.20. Id.
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held the tax on the theory that because the tax burdened the individual Indian rather than the tribe, the state's tax did not affect the rights of the tribe
as a self-governing body. 96
The United States Supreme Court, after a thorough discussion of the history of Indian sovereignty, rejected the reasoning of the court of appeals.
Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, asserted that although the
tax did not fall directly on the tribe, there might be an important, protectable federal interest in the individual Indian's economic condition. The
Court's conclusion that reservation Indians were exempt from state taxation
was not based on the fact that state taxation might affect a specific federal
program, as had existed in Warren Trading Post,97 but rather on the exclusivity of the relationship between Indians and the Federal Government and
the concomitant lack of state jurisdiction.9" The Court employed Indian
sovereignty as the backdrop against which it analyzed relevant treaties and
statutes. However, it did not view Indian sovereignty as a controlling factor. 99 As in Warren Trading Post, the McClanahan Court emphasized the
extensive degree of federal involvement in Indian life."o Although the relevant treaty' °1 and statute 10 2 examined in McClanahan did not expressly exempt reservation Indians from state taxation, the Court found that the
federal role in Indian life was so pervasive that any state taxation was
foreclosed. 103
96. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 14 Ariz. App. 452, 457, 484 P.2d 221, 226 (1971),
rev'd, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
97. The Court referred to several unrelated federal statutes as evidence of Congress' general intent that states could not tax Indians. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 176-77.
98. Id. at 177. The Court noted that Congress provided a method by which Arizona
could acquire civil and criminal jurisdiction over the Navajo Reservation, but that Arizona
had not availed itself of this procedure. Id. at 177-78.
99. Id. at 172.
100. See id. at 173 n. 12. Although the state did have some role in funding education and
welfare within the reservation, the Court found that the Federal Government met the greater
share of such needs. Id.
101. Treaty with the Navajo Indians, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667, 668. Because treaties were
to be interpreted most favorably to the Indians, the Court determined that the silence concerning authorization of state taxation in the treaty meant that "the Navajo treaty ... preclude[s]
extension of state law - including state tax law - to Indians on the Navajo Reservation." McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 175.
102. Arizona Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 61-219, 36 Stat. 557, 569 (1910). See McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 175 n.14. The Arizona Enabling Act's silence concerning state taxation of
reservation Indians did not meet the requirement of an express congressional grant of state
taxation jurisdiction. Id. at 175.
103. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 179-80. The Indian's "activity is totally within the sphere
which the relevant treaty and statutes leave for the Federal Government and for the Indians
themselves." Id.
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Under the pervasive federal role theory, a state's showing of substantial
expenditures and interests on reservations proved unavailing as a justification for the extension of state taxation jurisdiction. For example, in Moe v.
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation," the
Supreme Court unanimously rejected the argument that, because the state
operated school systems and provided and maintained a system of roads on
the reservation, the state could levy its personal property tax, used to raise
revenue for schools and roads,' 0 5 on automobiles owned and operated by
Indians on the reservation."16 The Court asserted that so long as the tribe
retained its tribal organization, the Court would apply preemption analysis
despite the Indians' business and social integration with a substantial nonIndian population living on the reservation.10 7 Relying on McClanahan,the
Court determined that the state could not tax the automobiles without congressional consent.'0" The Court also found that the state was barred from
taxing cigarettes sold on the reservation to reservation Indians. 0 9
B.

Marketing the Exemption

The taxes invalidated in Warren Trading Post, McClanahan, and Moe
represented various state efforts to tax reservation Indians for economic activities on a reservation.' 10 Attempts to limit the applicability of the tax
104. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
105. Id. at 467 (quoting Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation v. Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1297, 1313 (D. Mont. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 463 (1976)).
106. Id. at 469.
107. Tribal members only comprised approximately nineteen percent of the total reservation population. Id. at 466. Based on the substantial non-Indian character of reservation-land
ownership patterns, as well as on the character of the population, Montana argued unsuccessfully that the Dawes Act operated to extend state taxation jurisdiction to all land within the
reservation that was not retained by the United States in trust for the tribe. Id. at 471. The
Court rejected this argument on two grounds. First, the Court determined that focusing on
actual land ownership of individual tracts to determine state jurisdiction would create an
" 'impractical pattern of checkerboard jurisdiction' " that was contrary to the intent of federal
policy. Id. at 478 (quoting Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962)). Second, the
Court asserted that Congress, by enacting the IRA, had repudiated, albeit not repealed, the
policies of the Dawes Act. Id. at 479.
108. Id. at 476 (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973)).
109. Id. at 480-81. Montana also argued that enforced tax exemption for Indians was a
violation of the due process and equal protection rights of non-Indians. The Court rejected
this theory, noting that if special federal treatment of Indians was impermissible, then title 25
of the United States Code would be erased entirely, and two centuries of federal commitments
to tribes could not be honored. Id. at 480. The Court did not explain how the constitutional
rights of citizens of the United States became subordinate to acts of Congress or Executive
orders.
110. State taxation of Indian economic activity conducted outside the reservation was upheld in the companion case to McClanahan, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145
(1973).
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exemption for the economic activity of non-Indians on reservations have
fared better from the states' perspective."1 ' Another major issue in Moe was
whether an Indian-owned and operated cigarette shop was required to collect a state tax on nonexempt customers.112 If the state could not require the
Indian cigarette retailers to collect the tax, they could sell cigarettes to nonexempt customers at a substantial discount. 1 3 The tribes argued that the
burden imposed by the state cigarette tax fell on the Indian retailer, thereby
inflicting measurable losses. 14
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, basing its opinion on the
lower court's finding that the tax statute created a conclusive presumption
that the tax fell on the retail customer.' 15 The Court recognized that the
Indian retailer's refusal to collect the tax, rather than advancing the tribe's
legitimate right not to be so taxed, merely allowed nonexempt customers to
' Furthermore, the Court found that the burflout their legal obligation. 16
den on the tribal economy of requiring the Indian retailer to collect the state
tax was minimal and therefore was not within the scope of the preemption
17

doctrine.
Four years after the Moe decision, the Supreme Court decided Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, another case
involving state taxation of Indian-owned automobiles and cigarette sales.1 1 8
While the result in this case closely paralleled that of Moe, factual circumstances produced a schism in the Court's previous consensus.11 9 Whereas in
Moe the Salish and Kootenai Tribes had not played a direct role in cigarette
111. See generally Fredericks, State Regulation in Indian Country: The Supreme Court's
Marketing Exemptions Concept,A JudicialSword Through the Heartof Tribal Self-Determination, 50 MONT. L. REV. 49 (1989) (suggesting that courts should strictly scrutinize alleged
marketing exemptions).
112. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S.
463, 467-68 (1976). The Court did not reach the issue of whether the tax exemption extended
to Indians who resided on the reservation but were not members of the Confederated Salish
and Kootenai Tribes.
113. At the time the case was decided, the cigarette tax totalled $1.20 per carton, including
special excise taxes earmarked to benefit war veterans and to retire public bonded indebtedness. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 84-5606 (1975 Supp.). This tax is now $1.80 per carton.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-11-111 (1989).
114. Moe, 425 U.S. at 481.
115. Id. at 482 (citing MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 84-5601(1) (1947) (current version at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-11-112 (1989)).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 483.
118. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
119. Id. Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court in which all Justices joined at least
partially. However, Justices Brennan (joined by Justice Marshall), Rehnquist, and Stewart
each filed a separate opinion dissenting from various sections of the Court's opinion. Id. at
137.
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marketing,"12 in Colville, the tribes' 2 ' were directly involved in the cigarette
business through sales taxes' 2 2 or, in one instance, retail outlets. 23 Because
the cigarettes marketed by the tribes did not originate on or have any significant nexus with the reservation, the Court found that these marketing
schemes were not essential components of the tribes' post-IRA economic
self-determination effort.124 Therefore, the IRA did not preempt the state
taxes.' 12
In addition, the Court determined that the fact that the Indian
taxing ordinances were federally approved did not constitute a proper dele26
gation by Congress of the federal power to preempt state taxes.'
The Court employed a balancing test to decide whether the taxes infringed
on tribal self-government. Specifically, the Court weighed the tribes' interest
in taxing products not produced on the reservation but sold to taxpayers
who did not use tribal services against the state's interest in taxing the same
goods provided to recipients of state services.' 2 7 Ultimately, the Court determined that the State of Washington's interest prevailed. The Court found
no nonrevenue purposes for the tribal cigarette businesses. Consequently,
the Court asserted that state taxation would not disturb or disarrange any
federal regulatory scheme. 128 The Court concluded that because the market
for cigarettes sold to non-Indians was entirely due to the tax exemption, the
tribes were, in effect, marketing tax exemptions, not cigarettes. For this reason, the Court opined that any adverse impact created by eliminating the tax
120. See Moe, 425 U.S. at 467. Although the tribes leased the land upon which the stores
were located, there was no indication that the Salish and Kootenai Tribes had any management or regulatory role. Id.
121. Colville, 447 U.S. at 143-44. The tribes involved were the Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Reservation, the Makah, the Lummi, and the Confederated Tribes of the Yakima
Nation. Id.
122. Id. at 141, 144-45. Tribal taxes on cigarettes ranged from 22.5 to 50 cents per carton.
Washington's tax was $1.60 per carton. Id.
123. Id. at 144-45.
124. Id. at 155.
125. Id. Justice Brennan dissented from this portion of the opinion. Id. at 168 (Brennan,
J., concurring and dissenting).
126. Id. at 156. Justice Brennan also disagreed with the Court on this point. Id. at 172
(Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
127. Id. at 157. Justice Rehnquist, in his separate opinion, suggested that the focus of the
inquiry should be on congressional intent, rather than a balancing of interests. Id. at 177
(Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting).
128. Id. at 158.
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the
exemption neither violated the Indian commerce clause 129 nor compelled
1 30
state to provide the consumers with a credit to offset the tribal tax.
C. A ParticularizedInquiry: The Bracker Balancing Test
The Court's lack of an Indian preemption doctrine composed of a welldefined body of principles13 ' became apparent when, within weeks of Colville, the Court divided along different lines in White Mountain Apache Tribe
v. Bracker.132 In Bracker, the Supreme Court considered whether the State
of Arizona could impose a motor vehicle license and fuel use tax on a nonIndian company for its logging operations conducted on a reservation pursuant to a contract with the tribe.1 33 Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall, after recounting the analysis in McClanahan,'34 defined the
preemption analysis as "a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state,
federal, and tribal interests at stake ... designed to determine whether, in
the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal
law."' 3 5 As in Warren Trading Post, a pervasive federal regulatory struc-

ture existed that state taxation could upset.' 3 6 The tribal interest at stake
129. Id.at 157. The Court suggested that the Indian commerce clause has a "limited role
to play" in preventing states from placing undue burdens on Indian commerce. Id. Because
the commerce involved in this case was an artificial creation of the tax exemption, the Court
did not consider the imposition of the tax, although it may end the commerce entirely, as an
impermissible burden. Id. at 157-58.
130. Id. Justice Stewart, in his separate opinion, suggested that an offset credit would be
appropriate because the state and tribal taxation schemes, with the exception of the Yakima
arrangement, were substantially the same in operation. Id. at 175-76 (Stewart, J., concurring
and dissenting).
The Court also reached an issue not decided in Moe, determining that the Indian tax exemption was a consequence of political rather than racial status. Therefore, Indians living on the
reservation who were not members of the governing tribe had to pay all applicable state taxes.
Id. at 160-61.
Consequently, while the Court has continued to use the term "non-Indian" to describe persons not exempt from state taxes, the correct term should be "nonmember." The Court has
been criticized for its continued use of the term "non-Indian" without clarifying the distinction
between non-Indian and nonmember. Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136, 1139-41 (9th Cir. 1987)
rev'd 110 S.Ct. 2053 (1990). This Note continues to use the term "non-Indian" to denote a
person not a member of the governing tribe.
131. Colville, 447 U.S. at 176 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting).
132. 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (5-1-3 decision). Justice Marshall wrote the opinion of the Court
in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Powell joined.
Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justices Stewart and Rehnquist joined.
133. Id. at 137-38.
134. Id. at 141-45.
135. Id. at 145. In McClanahan, the Court defined the state's interest as "regulating the
affairs of non-Indians." McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973).
136. The Court recounted in detail the applicable federal regulations. Bracker, 448 U.S. at
146-49.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 39:639

was the continued viability of its timber economy.' 3 7 This tribal interest was
in effect equivalent to the federal interest by virtue of a federal policy which
encouraged tribes to revitalize tribal governments and to assume control
over tribal economies. 138 Against these interests, the state indicated that it
had a general desire to raise revenues.13 9
The balancing test employed by the Court in Bracker differed from that
used in Colville. In Colville, the Court used a balancing test only to determine state jurisdiction in relation to tribal sovereignty.' 4 By contrast, the
Court in Bracker, as it had in McClanahan, 4 ' mentioned tribal sovereignty
as a bar to state jurisdiction, but in Bracker based its decision on supremacy
clause grounds by balancing the Federal Government's role and interests
142
against the state's role and interests.
Dissenting in Bracke, Justice Stevens 143 noted that the total tax burden
Arizona sought to impose would amount to considerably less than one percent of the non-Indian contractor's total annual profits.'" According to
Justice Stevens, this was not enough to disturb and disarrange the federal
regulatory scheme. 145 Based on the probable lack of impact on federal interests, the dissent argued that absent a stronger showing of congressional in14 6
tent, the federal interests should not preempt the state tax.
Justice Marshall applied the Bracker balancing test again in his majority
opinion in Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue. 147 In
Ramah, New Mexico imposed a 3.75% gross receipts tax on a non-Indian
contractor who was constructing buildings for a reservation school district.' 48 Pursuant to standard industry practice, the tribe reimbursed the
contractor for taxes the contractor paid to the state. 149 In this case, the
137. Id. at 149-50.
138. Id. at 149 (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 151 (1973)).
139. Id. at 150. The Court rejected Arizona's argument that the tax generally helped to
offset the cost of roads because the Federal Government, or the tribe, built all of the onreservation roads used by this timber operation. Id.
140. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
157 (1980).
141. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1973).
142. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142-45.
143. Id. at 153 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 158-59.
145. Id. at 157.

146. Id. at 159.
147. 458 U.S. 832, 846 (1982).
148. Id. at 834. See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-4 (1978). The New Mexico legislature
increased the gross receipts tax rate to 4.75%. Id.§ 7-9-4 (1988).
149. Ramah, 458 U.S. at 835. The lower court refused to find the state preempted from
levying this tax because the tax was legally incident on the non-Indian contractor. Ramah
Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 95 N.M. 708, 710, 625 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Ct.
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Court identified the primary federal interest as tribal control of education.15 o
While the state tax may have only marginally compromised tribal control of
education, the Court found that the state's interest in the tax was negligible.'" Although New Mexico argued that it had supplied services of considerable value to the contractor in support of its activities off the reservation,

the Court found that the fact that the tribe actually paid the taxes made this
argument irrelevant.15 2 Relying on Bracker, the Court invalidated the state
15 3

tax.
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Rehnquist 154 criticized the Court's
reliance on Bracker, arguing that the mere probability of tribal injury had

dominated the balance. 155 Under the Moe and Colville decisions, the fact of
injury did not end the analysis. Justice Rehnquist, therefore, concluded that
without more evidence of congressional intent than general statutes giving
Indians control of education, the majority was incorrect in holding that fed156

eral law preempted taxes on school construction.
Finally, the Court in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians'5 7
clarified the Moe and Colville holdings by asserting that the determinative
factor in those cases was the origination of the product sold on the reservations. In Cabazon, the Court determined that the Cabazon Band did not
have to submit to state regulation its high stakes bingo games.' 58 The fact
App. 1980), cert. quashed, 96 N.M. 17, 627 P.2d 412 (1981), rev'd, 458 U.S. 832 (1982).
Although the tax impacted the tribe, the impact was by virtue of a private arrangement between the tribe and the contractor. Ramah, 458 U.S. at 835-56.
150. Ramah, 458 U.S. at 840.
151. Id. at 843-45.
152. Id. at 844 & n.8.
153. Id. at 845. The Court also rejected the Solicitor General's argument that the Court
should modify its preemption analysis to find state taxation jurisdiction presumptively preempted by the Indian commerce clause. Id. at 846. The Solicitor advanced, as a primary
reason in support of this change, that the change would add certainty to, and thus help simplify, lower court consideration of preemption questions. Id. at 845-56. Stating that its analysis was clear enough, the Court opined that its consistent admonishment that lower courts
must construe federal statutes relating to Indians liberally in the Indians' favor would protect
Indian interests as lower courts apply the Bracker balancing test. Id. at 846.
154. Justice Rehnquist was joined in his dissent by Justices White and Stevens. Id. at 847.
155. Id. at 848 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 854-55.
157. 480 U.S. 202, 219 (1987).
158. Id. at 216-18. The Court concluded that state regulation of tribal bingo was inconsistent with the congressional policy of encouraging tribal economic self-sufficiency. Id. at 221.
As evidence of this policy, the Court cited the Indian Financing Act of 1974 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)) and the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n
(1982 & Supp. III 1985)). The Court also relied on President Reagan's 1983 statement on
Indian policy: "It is important to the concept of self-government that tribes reduce their dependence on Federal funds by providing a greater percentage of the cost of their self-govern-
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that the revenue generated by the bingo games originated on the reservation,
coupled with the fact that the Cabazon Band had virtually no other resources to develop, overcame the state's articulated interest in preventing the
spread of organized crime.' 59 Justice Stevens dissented, 1" suggesting that
the more appropriate test was whether Congress granted the tribe an exemption from state jurisdiction, not whether the tribe was burdened by state
regulation. 161
As the doctrine of Indian preemption developed through 1987, the Court
focused on whether a specific legitimate state interest outweighed the possible impact of state taxation on tribal economic life. Although congressional
intent was an essential element, the Court was willing to infer intent from
the broad policies underlying even indirectly related statutes. 62 The Court
extended the exemption from taxes to non-Indian contractors when taxing
them would injure the tribe. The Court established an exception to the rule
of no state jurisdiction to tax, where the tribes imported products from
outside the reservation for resale at tax exempt prices. Under this exception,
the state could impose taxes on non-Indian purchasers.
III.

PREEMPTION BASED ON THE 1938 ACT

Congress passed the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938163 as part of the
overall IRA scheme to promote tribal economic and political self-sufficiency." 64 Specifically, the 1938 Act gave tribes a direct role in deciding
whether, and under what conditions, they should lease tribal lands for mineral development. 6 5 The 1938 Act also simplified leasing procedures and
removed technical barriers to leasing with the explicit aim of encouraging
166
tribal economic development.
ment." 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 99 (Jan. 24, 1983). These laws and pronouncements
are only marginally related to bingo.
159. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 220.
160. Justice Stevens was joined in his dissent by Justices O'Connor and Scalia. Id. at 222.
161. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. See supra note 158.

163. Pub. L. No. 75-506, 52 Stat. 347 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g
(1982)).
164. See supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
165. Compare 25 U.S.C. § 396a (1982) (expressly providing for tribal consent to leases)
with 25 U.S.C. § 399 (1982) (silent concerning tribal consent to leases).
166. See H.R. REP. No. 1872, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938); S. REP. No. 985, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1937).
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A.

Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians: Preemption
by Canon of Construction

Congress explicitly authorized state taxation of tribal mineral interests in
a 1924 amendment to the original Indian mineral leasing statute enacted in
1891.1 67 While the 1938 Act did not include any language concerning state
taxation of the extraction of tribally owned minerals, the Supreme Court
held, in Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians,161 that congressional silence
did not constitute express consent to such taxation. Moreover, the Court
asserted that Congress intended the 1938 Act to repeal the express consent
given under the 1924 Amendment.1 69 At issue in Blackfeet were several
state value-based oil and gas production taxes, the full amount of which the
non-Indian lessees had paid. 170 The lessees deducted the portion of the taxes
attributable to the Blackfeet Tribe's royalty interest from royalty payments
1 71
made to the tribe.
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, found that the general repealer
clause of the 1938 Act overrode the earlier tax authorization found in the
1891 Act and the 1924 amendment. 172 Justice Powell based his conclusion
on a distinction in the broadly defined goals of Congress between the Dawes
Act period, 173 during which the 1891 Act and 1924 amendment had been
passed, and the IRA period, of which the 1938 Act was an important component. Although courts usually do not give general repealers much effect, 74 the Court held that the canon of statutory construction, under which
federal statutes are construed liberally in favor of Indians, allowed the 1938
1 75
Act's lack of authorization of taxation to mandate the Court's conclusion.
167. The Act of May 29, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-158, 43 Stat. 244 (codified at 25 U.S.C.

§ 398 (1982)) supplemented the Act of Feb. 28, 1891, 26 Stat. 795 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 397
(1982)). The purpose of the 1924 amendment was to end applicability of the intergovernmen-

tal immunity doctrine to non-Indian mineral lessees on reservations created by an act of Congress. Congress passed an additional amendment in 1927 to end the applicability of
intergovernmental immunity on reservations created by Executive order. Indian Oil Act of
1927, Pub. L. No. 69-702, 44 Stat. 1347 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 398c (1982)).
168. 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985).

169. Id. at 767 n.5.
170. Id. at 761.
171. Id.

172. Id. at 767.
173. Id. at 766-67.
174. "It is hornbook law that a general repealer is in 'legal contemplation a nullity.'"
Blackfeet Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 729 F.2d 1192, 1204 (9th Cir. 1984) (Blaine Anderson,
J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting IA C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.08, at 221 (4th ed. 1972)), aff'd, 471 U.S. 759 (1985).

175. Blackfeet, 471 U.S. at 767.
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Because Blackfeet came to the Court as a result of a grant of summary
judgment in the lower court, 176 several important issues were not fully developed for appeal. For example, the Supreme Court did not address the issue
of whether the tribe actually bore the burden of the taxes. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had ordered consideration of this
1 77
question on remand.
B.

Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana: A Restatement of Preemption

The Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana 178 case arose from Montana's attempt to collect coal severance taxes from non-Indian coal producers on
lands leased from the Crow Tribe pursuant to the 1938 Act. 17 9 The tribe
challenged these taxes before the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit on two occasions. Each time the court wrote a comprehensive
opinion.'
Inasmuch as the Supreme Court summarily affirmed Crow II in
1988,181 these opinions constituted the most complete exposition of the law
of preemption prior to Cotton.
In Crow I, the lessee, rather than the tribe, bore a statutory obligation to
pay the coal severance taxes at issue, 1 82 ranging as high as thirty percent of
the mine mouth value of the coal.'1 3 Because the coal underlay land that the
176. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 507 F. Supp. 446, 453 (D. Mont. 1981), aff'd
sub nom. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians v. Groff, 729 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1982), op. withdrawn,
709 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Blackfeet Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 729 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff'd, 471 U.S. 759 (1985).
177. Blackfeet, 729 F.2d at 1203. The tax statute created a presumption that the tax was
legally incident on the non-Indian producer, although the producer was being taxed on the
tribes' interest. Id. The Ninth Circuit directed the district court to use the criteria in Crow
Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981), amended, 665 F.2d 1390 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982) (Crow I), to determine whether the tax created an
unacceptably heavy indirect burden on the tribe. Id.
178. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 469 F. Supp. 154 (D. Mont. 1979), rev'd, 650 F.2d
1104 (9th Cir. 1981), amended, 665 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982)
(Crow I), on remand Crow Tribe of Indians v. United States, 657 F. Supp. 573 (D. Mont.
1985), rev'd sub nom. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd,
484 U.S. 997 (1988) (Crow H).
179. Crow , 650 F.2d at 1107.
180. See cases cited supra note 178. Although the Ninth Circuit decided Crow I before
Blackfeet, the Supreme Court affirmed Crow H after it decided Blackfeet. This chronology
explains the order of discussion of these cases in this Note.
181. Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 484 U.S. 997 (1988). Chief Justice Rehnquist
would have heard the case. Id.
182. Crow , 650 F.2d at 1108 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-35-104 (1979)).
183. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-35-103 (1985). The Supreme Court upheld application of
this tax to non-Indian coal in 1981. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609
(1981). The tax rate was lowered in 1987. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-35-103 (1989). The Crow
Tribe imposes a 25% severance tax on all coal mined within the reservation. CROW TRIB.
COAL TAXATION CODE tit. I §§ 1-13 (1982). This tax is applicable to tribal coal mined
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Crow Tribe had ceded to the United States in 1904, 184 and because the land
was several miles north of the present Crow Indian Reservation, the state
provided virtually all services. The tribe, in contrast, provided no services to
area residents and businesses. 8 5
The United States District Court for the District of Montana dismissed
the Crow Tribe's challenge of this tax for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.' 8 6 The court reasoned that the 1938 Act did not
preempt the state's imposition of the severance tax because the tribe did not
have a legal obligation to pay the taxes."8 7 The Ninth Circuit in Crow I
reversed, remanding the case to the district court.188 The Ninth Circuit held
that although the legal obligation to pay coal severance taxes was indeed on
the non-Indian producer, the alleged economic effects of the tax, if proven at
trial, could constitute an unreasonable burden on tribal interests protected
by the 1938 Act.1 89 In its complaint, the tribe alleged that the state tax
drastically reduced the market for the tribe's coal.' 9° However, the court of
appeals agreed with the State of Montana that some impact on the tribe
could be justified if the state interest was sufficiently legitimate, provided the
impact on the tribe was not excessive.' 9
On remand, the district court again found the tax permissible, reasoning
that the state's interests were legitimate and that the tax did not cause the
economic injuries alleged by the tribe.' 92 Upon the Crow Tribe's appeal of
the district court's remand decision, the Ninth Circuit issued its Crow 11
opinion1 93 that contained a comprehensive restatement of Indian preempoutside the reservation boundaries pursuant to the Crow Tribal Constitution. CROW TRIB.
CONST. art. VI, § X (1982).
184. Act of April 27, 1904, Pub. L. No. 58-183, 33 Stat. 352. In 1958, Congress compelled
the Crow Tribe to accept ownership of that part of the 1904 cession not already alienated from
the United States. Act of May 19, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-420, 72 Stat. 121. For this reason, the
Ninth Circuit ruled that the coal underlying the ceded and restored area was a part of the
reservation for purposes of satisfying the on-reservation test of Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973). Crow II, 819 F.2d at 898.
185. Crow Tribe of Indians v. United States, 657 F. Supp. 573, 579-83 (D. Mont. 1985)
(lower court decision in Crow II), rev'd sub noma.Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d
895 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 484 U.S. 997 (1988).
186. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 469 F. Supp. 154, 164 (D. Mont. 1979) (lower
court's decision in Crow I), rev'd, 650 F.2d 1104, amended, 665 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982).
187. Id. at 162-64.
188. Crow , 650 F.2d at 1117.
189. Id. at 1112.
190. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 469 F. Supp. at 157. See also Crow II, 819 F.2d at
899-900.
191. Crow I, 650 F.2d at 1113.
192. Crow Tribe of Indians v. United States, 657 F. Supp. at 587-89.
193. Crow II, 819 F.2d at 896-98.
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tion analysis. The Ninth Circuit found that the first step in preemption analysis was to determine whether the tax interfered with the policies underlying
the 1938 Act.1 94 Relying on evidence that showed that sales of Montana
coal decreased in the period after the imposition of the tax,' 9 5 which was in
direct contradiction of the lower court's factual findings concerning the
cause of the decrease,' 96 the Ninth Circuit concluded that the state
sever19 7
ance tax compromised the federal goals underlying the 1938 Act.
The second step in the Ninth Circuit's preemption analysis required the
98
court to determine whether the state tax imposed a burden on the tribe.'
The court determined that Montana had not proven that the impact of its
taxes was "negligible."' 99 Consequently, the court employed the Bracker
balancing of interests 2" and rejected Montana's argument that it could, after Moe and Colville, tax non-Indians whose activities were conducted off the
reservation. 20 1 The court, relying on Cabazon, limited the application of
Moe and Colville to cases of importation of goods not produced on the reservation, goods which the Ninth Circuit found clearly distinguishable from the
coal at issue in Crow H 202 The court determined that the Crow coal, a
reservation resource, was essential to the tribe's economic development,
thereby furthering an important federal goal underlying the IRA.2 °3 Finding a compromise of the federal goal, the court analyzed whether the state
interest was sufficient to justify the assessment of a severance tax. 2"
In addition to its general interest in raising revenue, Montana argued that
it had an interest in protecting the environment and preserving coal for future generations to hedge against the cyclical booms and busts of the state's
historically mineral based economy.20 5 In considering Montana's claimed
interest in environmental protection, the court found that the tax statute
itself was not narrowly tailored to meet this goal.20 6 Specifically, the court
194. Id. at 898.
195. The parties disputed the cause of this decline. Montana argued that the decline in
sales of Montana coal, relative to sales of Wyoming coal, was caused by the increased population in Wyoming's traditional market area, and by the lower sulfur content of Wyoming coal.
Id.at 899-900. Montana also contended that the relative cost of coal transportation was a
major factor in the decline of the sales. Id. at 900.
196. Crow Tribe of Indians v. United States, 657 F. Supp. at 588-89.
197. Crow II, 819 F.2d at 900.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.at 899.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 898; see also Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 767 (1985).
204. Crow II, 819 F.2d at 900.
205. Id.; see also Crow , 650 F.2d at 1113-14.
206. Crow II, 819 F.2d at 901.
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discounted the state's need for the tax statute as a measure for environmental control because other state and federal regulations largely served those
purposes.20 7 The court also questioned the state's environmental justification for the statute because the state spent only 8.75% of the coal severance
tax revenue for environmental or coal-development impact-related purposes
by 198 1.208 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit repeated its finding in Crow I
that the state did not have a legitimate interest in appropriating the tribe's
mineral wealth. 2 ' Therefore, because the coal severance tax did not advance a legitimate state interest and because the tax burdened federal policy,
the court found that Montana was preempted from collecting this tax.210
The United States Supreme Court summarily affirmed this decision in early
1988.211 However, one year later, in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mex-

ico,21 2 the Court substantially altered the Crow II analysis.
IV.

COTTON PETROLEUM CORP. v. NEW MEXICO: A NEW Focus

In 1976, Cotton Petroleum Corporation acquired five oil and gas leases on
the Jicarilla Apache Reservation in New Mexico.21 3 Pursuant to the Indian
Oil Act of 1927,214 the state collected five separate oil taxes from Cotton.2" 5
In 1982, Cotton paid the state taxes under protest.21 6 Cotton subsequently
brought an action in state court seeking a refund of taxes it paid, on the
theory that New Mexico levied these taxes in violation of the Indian and
interstate commerce clauses, the due process clause, and the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution.21 7 In an unpublished opinion, the
District Court for the First Judicial District, Santa Fe County denied re207.
208.
209.
210.

Id.
Id.

Id. at 902 (quoting Crow 1, 650 F.2d at 1114).
Id. The court also found that the Montana tax was barred on the independent ground

that it infringed on tribal sovereignty, id. at 903, which the Supreme Court defined as the

"right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." Williams v. Lee,
358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959); see also Fisher v. District Court of Sixteenth Judicial Dist., 424 U.S.
382 (1976); Kennerly v. District Court of Ninth Judicial Dist., 400 U.S. 423 (1971). The
Court discussed, but did not apply, this ground in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n,

411 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1973), and White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142
(1980).

211. Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 484 U.S. 997 (1988).
212. 109 S. Ct. 1698 (1989).

213. Id. at 1703.
214. 25 U.S.C. § 398c (1982).
215. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1703.

216. The Court seemed to believe that these objections were the result of a footnote in
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1703, 1713 n.18.
217. Id. at 1703.
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lief.2 1' The district court, applying preemption analysis, found that because
the taxes did not impact the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, New Mexico was not
preempted from collecting the taxes.2 1 9 The New Mexico Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's ruling.22 °
The New Mexico Court of Appeals focused primarily on the commerce
clause and due process clause aspects of Cotton's argument.2 21 The court
found that despite the emphasis of prior United States Supreme Court decisions on examining the relative federal and state responsibilities, the Constitution did not require that state-imposed taxes should be equivalent to the
value of state services provided to tax payers.22 2 Moreover, the court determined that Cotton failed to prove that the state taxes imposed an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. 2 23 The court concluded that because
Cotton had not proven that there was an impact on the Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, the 1938 Act did not preempt the state from collecting the taxes.2 24
The New Mexico Supreme Court declined to hear Cotton's appeal of the
lower court's decision, 225 and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.2 2 6
A.

The Court's Opinion: Vindication of a Decade of Dissent

The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, affirmed the decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals. 22" The first and most significant
portion of the opinion concerned Cotton's supremacy clause challenge. Cotton argued that the IRA, the 1938 Act, and the extensive tribal and federal
regulatory control over Cotton's activities preempted New Mexico's imposition of the oil taxes because the taxes created a significant economic burden
218. Cotton Petroleum v. State, 106 N.M. 517, 519, 745 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Ct. App. 1987),
cert. quashed, 106 N.M. 511, 745 P.2d 1159 (1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 1698 (1989).

219. Id.
220. Id. at 522, 745 P.2d at 1175.
221. The appellate court's emphasis on the commerce and due process clauses probably
reflects the competing theories advanced by the parties in the case. Id. at 519, 745 P.2d at
1172. Cotton argued that the primary focus should be on whether the state and tribal taxation,
taken together, impermissibly interfered with interstate commerce. Id. Cotton deemphasized
preemption in its theory of the case, using it as a backdrop to the commerce clause issue. Id.
The state, in contrast, argued that its interest should prevail under either a commerce clause
analysis or, alternatively, a preemption analysis. Id. The tribe, as an amicus, suggested preemption as the proper theory and argued that state taxes impermissibly compromised the purpose of the 1938 Act, which was to maximize tribal revenue. Id.
222. Id. at 520, 745 P.2d at 1173.
223. Id. at 521, 745 P.2d at 1174.
224. Id. at 521-22, 745 P.2d at 1174-75.
225. Cotton Petroleum v. State, 106 N.M. 511, 745 P.2d 1159 (1987).
226. 485 U.S. 1005 (1988). See also supra note 28.

227. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1705.
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on the tribe.2 28 The Court rejected these arguments, reasoning that neither
the 1938 Act nor the IRA explicitly repealed the 1927 statute2 2 9 that
granted the state authority to tax the production of this resource.23 °
The Court also noted that Congress, when it passed the 1938 Act, did not
expect that the doctrine of federal immunity from state taxation would protect non-Indian energy developers doing business with the tribes. 231 Therefore, the Court opined that the 1938 Act's silence regarding state taxation
did not repeal an earlier express waiver of immunity.2 32 Furthermore, the
Court accepted the state court's findings that the tribe did not suffer an economic burden as a result of the state taxes. It also acknowledged that the
state performed significant services on the reservation to justify the state's
jurisdiction to impose the taxes.2 33
B.

The Dissent

Justice Blackmun,2 34 in his dissent, rejected the Court's reading of the
historical context of the 1938 Act. 235 Noting the relative timing of the case
that limited the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity2 36 and the 1938
Act, the dissent maintained that the Court could not consider congressional
knowledge of the lack of federal immunity from state taxes as conclusive
evidence that Congress, by remaining silent, intended to authorize states to
228. Id. at 1708. The Court listed several applicable federal and tribal regulations. Id. at
1712 n.16.
229. The Act of May 29, 1924, 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1982). See also supra note 167.
230. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1710.
231. Id. at 1710-11. See also supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
232. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1710-11. This complicated argument relies on the relative timing
of the passage of the 1938 Act and the Court's decision in Helvering v. Mountain Producers
Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938). Although Congress drafted the 1938 Act before Mountain Producers was issued, see infra note 237, the Court found this point unpersuasive because the result
of Mountain Producers was "plainly foreshadowed by the development of the law.., during
the preceding decade." Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1711 n.13.
233. Id. at 1712. Compare the Cotton Court's deference to the state court's finding with
the Ninth Circuit's rejection of the federal district court's findings in Crow II.
The Court also found that Indian tribes are not states within the meaning of the commerce
clause: "[T]he language of the Clause no more admits of treating Indian tribes as States than
of treating foreign nations as States." Id. at 1716. Cotton's argument, which the Court found
"most persuasive," albeit still unsuccessful, was that tax payments were impermissibly disproportionate to the amount of services provided. Id. at 1714. The Court rejected this argument,
noting that the due process clause does not mandate a perfect fit, or even a reasonable relationship, between taxes and benefits received. Id. at 1714-15.
234. Justice Blackmun was joined in his dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Id. at
1716.
235. Id. at 1717-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
236. Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938).
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impose taxes. 237 More importantly, the fact that the IRA intervened between the 1927 waiver and the 1938 Act persuaded the dissent that the
Court was revisiting, and in effect overruling, its earlier decision in
238
Blackfeet.
Justice Blackmun asserted further that even without evidence of congressional intent, the Court should hold, based on prior preemption jurisprudence, that New Mexico was without authority to levy the oil taxes.2 39 The
dissent also compared the discrepancy between the amount of the tax allowed in this case (eight percent) with the taxes that had been disallowed in
Warren Trading Post (two percent) and Bracker (less than one percent), indicating that previous decisions demonstrated a low tolerance for state taxes
on non-Indians doing business with the tribes on the reservations. 24
V.

AFTER CoTToN:

THE NEW CRITERIA

The opinion in Cotton represents a marked departure from previous
Supreme Court jurisprudence. The extent of this departure is evident from a
point-by-point comparison of the elements of the Bracker balancing test that
the Court applied in Cotton with the elements applied in prior decisions.
A.

The New Balancing Test: A Thumb on the Scales

1. The Amount of the Tax
The dissent in Cotton asserted that the taxes allowed by the Cotton majority greatly exceeded those prohibited in Warren Trading Post and
Bracker.24 1 The fact that the low level of taxation involved in those cases
did not control their outcomes demonstrated persuasively that the amount of
tax was not an important issue.242 Yet, the Court reconciled apparently contradictory results between Cotton and Crow H1 precisely because of the
amount of the tax. The Cotton Court distinguished Crow HI on the grounds
that the taxes at issue there were extraordinarily high.2 43
237. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1718-22. The dissent challenged the Court's chronology, pointing out that the 1938 Act was drafted before the opinion in Mountain Producers was issued.
Id. at 1718-19. See also supra note 232. Given the possibility of opposite conclusions based on
the same facts, use of this evidence in either opinion cannot be considered persuasive.

238. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1719.
239. Id. at 1722.
240. Id. at 1726.
241. Id.

242. See supra notes 85, 143-44 and accompanying text.
243. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1713 n.17. In Crow , the tribal tax was equal to 84% of the
state tax. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. In Cotton, the tribal tax was equal to

75% of the state tax. See Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1703. The approximate equivalence of the
ratios of state to tribal tax rates in Cotton and Crow I suggests that, because different re-
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The Cotton Court's departure from the level of taxation analysis used in
the past undoubtedly will lead states to attempt to find the maximum allowable tax rates for economic activity of non-Indians conducted on reservations. At the very least, because Montana lowered the tax at issue in Crow II
for other reasons, 24 4 it may try again to tax the non-Indian producers of
Crow coal. Of course, the state must meet the threshold test of advancing a
legitimate interest,2 45 a threshold the Cotton Court's decision significantly
lowered.
2.

The State Interest

In addition to the size of the tax, the lack of a corresponding legitimate
state interest was a basis for the Ninth Circuit's rejection of the state tax in
Crow IL. 24 6 In Cotton, the state interest, aside from raising revenue, was not
well defined. The Cotton opinion only identified that the state provided
some services and regulated the spacing and inspection of wells. 247 The
Crow II court, in contrast, considered whether the specific taxing statute was
narrowly tailored to achieve a state interest.248 The Court, however, did not
apply a comparable test in Cotton. Had the Cotton Court employed such a
test, the fact that the tax statutes did not include language for the provision
of services certainly would have worked against upholding the validity of the
taxes. 249 The tax statutes themselves did not indicate that they were enacted
for any purpose other than raising revenues, a purpose identified by the
Court in Bracker, 25 0 Ramah,25 1 and Crow 11252 as not sufficiently legitimate.
As evidence of nonrevenue interests, the amount of services New Mexico
provided in Cotton was certainly not unique, particularly in comparison to
the similar or greater levels of regulatory and support services in Moe,253
Ramah,25 4 Crow I, 255 and McClanahan.256 The state interests, evidenced
sources with different economies are involved, the Montana tax at issue in Crow II was not
"extraordinary."

244. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-35-103(1)(b)-(c) (1989).
245. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 484 U.S.
997 (1988) (Crow II).
246. Id. See also supra notes 193-204 and accompanying text.
247. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1712.
248. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
249. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-29-1 to -8, 7-30-1 to -14, 7-31-1 to -11, 7-32-1 to -15, 7-341 to -9 (1986).
250. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracket, 448 U.S. 136, 150 (1980).
251. Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 845 (1982).
252. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 484 U.S.
997 (1988).
253. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S.
463, 476 (1976).
254. Ramah, 458 U.S. at 844.
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by the services provided, failed to control those cases because of federal services and regulatory structures, which the Court presumed were sufficient to
meet the tribes' needs. After Cotton, this presumption of federal sufficiency
may be disregarded. So long as the state provides services, the Court may
find that the state has a legitimate interest in taxing even when a federal
regulatory structure exists.
3.

The FederalRegulatory Structure

The Cotton Court stated, without explanation, that the federal regulations
in Bracker and Ramah excluded state involvement, but that the federal regulations in Cotton did not. 2" The lack of exclusivity was not self evident in
the Cotton regulations. Nor was the exclusive nature of the regulation involved clearly articulated in the prior cases.258
In fact, the state regulatory responsibilities cited in Cotton 259 appeared to
duplicate federal and tribal regulations.2 " The Court did not make clear
how a state, undertaking on its own initiative to provide services duplicative
of or supplementary to federal or tribal services, could gain jurisdiction to
tax non-Indian businesses in situations where, without such services, the
Court prohibited such taxes. The concept of supremacy is defeated if a state
may circumvent preemption of its laws by unilateral action absent congression grant. Although a state probably cannot bootstrap itself into direct taxation of tribal interests, it may now, by providing services, gain taxation
jurisdiction over non-Indians with whom the tribe may conduct its economic
affairs.
4.

The Incidence of the Tax

The Court distinguished its result in Cotton from the apparently contradictory result in Blackfeet by emphasizing that the legal obligation to pay
the tax was on the contractor rather than on the tribe. 261 In both Blackfeet
and Cotton, the non-Indian producer had a legal obligation to pay taxes.
Yet, in Blackfeet, the state taxed the whole value of the oil, whereas in Cotton, the state taxed the value of the oil after royalties to the tribe had been
255. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 484 U.S. 997 (1988).
256. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 173 n.12 (1973).
257. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1712-13.
258. See, e.g., Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 841 n.5
(1982).
259. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1712.
260. Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-2-12 (1989) (listing regulatory responsibilities of the
Oil and Gas Commission) with 43 C.F.R. §§ 3160-3186 (1988) (listing regulations of the Department of Interior concerning leases of Indian lands).
261. Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1711 n.14.

19901

Preempting Indian Preemption

paid.26 2 Therefore, the New Mexico tax at issue in Cotton did not explicitly
apply to any tribal interests. However, statutory incidence in the tax statute
did not save the taxes in Warren TradingPost,263 Bracker,26 and Ramah.2 65
In those cases, the tax burden fell on the tribes, not by operation of state law,
but simply by virtue of the tribes' relationships with non-Indian businesses.
The problem raised in Crow I regarding the indirect economic effects on a
tribe because of a tax imposed on non-Indian producers remains. In Crow I,
the Ninth Circuit determined that even a tax the tribe was not obligated to
pay could still injure the tribal economy, thereby compromising the federal
goal of economic self sufficiency.2 66 The Court in Cotton dismissed this
point, noting that although it could reasonably infer some damage, Cotton
had not proved that the tribe would be sufficiently injured.267 In contrast,
the Court did not clarify whether the successful challengers of state taxes in
Warren Trading Post, Bracker, Ramah, and Blackfeet had to meet a similar
burden. In Crow 11, the Ninth Circuit explicitly made "negligible impact"
the threshold beyond which the state could not impose taxes without showing a sufficiently legitimate state interest. 26' The Cotton holding represents a
significant change in the standard for permissible taxation. Thus, by raising
the threshold of tribal injury, and by removing from the state the burden of
establishing the threshold injury, the Cotton Court makes a successful challenge of state taxes considerably more difficult.
5. The Role of CongressionalIntent
By shifting the focus of preemption analysis from the probable impact on
tribal economic life to the intent of Congress,2 69 the Court's holding in Cot262. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-29-4.5(A)(2), 7-30-5(A)(2), 7-31-5(B), 7-32-5(A)(2) (1986).

263. Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 686 n.1 (1965).
264. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980).
265. Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 843 (1982).
266. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104, 1113 n.13 (9th Cir. 1981),
amended, 665 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982) (Crow I).
267. Cotton, 109 S.Ct. at 1713.

268. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 484 U.S.
997 (1988) (Crow II).
269. The first clause of the Court's opinion on preemption illustrates the new focus:
"[D]etermining whether federal legislation has pre-empted state taxation ... is primarily an
exercise in examining congressional intent." Cotton, 109 S.Ct. at 1707. Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Cotton brought the Bracker balancing test into line with his dissent in that

case. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text. The Cotton holding also echoes Justice
Stevens' dissent in Cabazon, that the statutes and broad policy statements the Court cited in

that case were not sufficiently related to the issue there raised. See California v. Cabazon Band
of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 220 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Cotton, the Court
refused to apply Blackfeet's liberal statutory construction whereby a broad statement of congressional intent with respect to the IRA controlled more specific statutes. Cotton, 109 S.Ct.
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ton permits states to impose taxes on non-Indian economic activity on reservations because states are freed from the broad congressional policy
statements that previously preempted such taxation. With this more narrow
reading of congressional intent, states need only heed specific congressional
limitations on their jurisdiction. This change spells the end of the preemption of taxes on all interest but that of the tribes.
Congress is not likely to enact specific language to extend tax exemption
beyond the tribes for two reasons. First, as a practical matter, Congress
would have to anticipate and address all potential business relationships between tribes and non-Indians. Even if achieving this first step was possible,
it is not clear whether Congress, whose members are particularly sensitive to
state interests, could impartially mediate the state versus tribe conflict. This
latter problem cuts right to the heart of the lack of a distinct tribal role in the
federalist structure. Realistically, Congress could not favor tribal interests
over those of the states its members represent. Similarly, the executive
branch might be unwilling, for political reasons, to favor the interests of the
tribes over those of the states. If neither political branch of government is
willing to advocate tribal interests, and if the judicial branch employs a narrow reading of congressional intent to determine the rights of tribes, tribal
interests will always be subordinated to state interests. Consequently, the
federal system of checks and balances will fail to protect the tribes.
B. Self Determination Descendant
As a result of Cotton, states can more easily extend taxation jurisdiction
onto Indian reservations. After Cotton, not only is the states' burden of
showing a legitimate interest lessened, but the burden on the challenger of
the tax to show damage to the tribe at the specific tax level is greater than in
the past. In addition, post-Cotton, the tribe or other parties challenging the
tax must show that the damage to the tribe is more than nominal, a marked
departure from past law. With these changes, the Cotton decision represents
at 1710. The Court, therefore, "corrected" another decision with which Justice Stevens had
disagreed. See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 768 (1985) (White, J.,
dissenting).
By not explicitly rejecting the outcome of Blackfeet, the Court is in effect holding that the
IRA suffices as a policy statement to render the general repealer in the 1938 Act effective
against taxes on Indian mineral interests. This result implies, however, that the IRA was not
sufficient as a policy statement to render the same general repealer effective against the same
previous tax authorizing statute as applied to non-Indian development of the same interests.
The Court's analysis does not completely explain this distinction. Personnel changes at the
Supreme Court undoubtedly played a significant role. Justice Powell, the author of the decision in Blackfeet, resigned from the Court, and Justice Kennedy, who had joined the dissent in
Blackfeet when the case was in the Ninth Circuit, was appointed to the Court in the interval
between Blackfeet and Cotton.
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an invitation to state legislatures to test the limits of their taxation jurisdiction in Indian country.
States can expect to avail themselves of new revenue by taxing non-Indians doing business with the tribes, with obvious consequences. If a tribe
attempts to impose its own tax, the non-Indian developer may either accept
a double tax or invest in resources elsewhere. Thus, the tribes are forced
into a decision between foregoing tax revenue or foregoing development of
tribal resources, and if the tribes forgo revenue, whether in the form of taxes,
royalties, or jobs, they will forego independence and self-determination .
Furthermore, in an era of massive federal budget deficits, the tribes cannot
rely on the Federal Government to cover the foregone tribal revenue, even if
the tribes so desire. Therefore, the tribes, in effect, can no longer afford to
provide services. Only time will tell whether states will seek to gain responsibility for providing services as eagerly as they sought to extend their taxation jurisdiction over the tribes' resources.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Provided the IRA self-determination model is still the statutory framework within which federal responsibilities to Indians are exercised, the result
of Cotton presents serious problems. Tribal economies clearly can be damaged by state taxation of non-Indian businesses that help develop tribal resources. For this reason, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to allow
state taxation to encompass the reservations. While there were cases in
which the Court found that states had taxation jurisdiction over non-Indian
purchase of tribal resources, these were limited exceptions allowed by the
Court because the economies in question were artificial creations. The decision in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico reverses this general trend,
making state taxation of non-Indian developers on the reservation the norm,
and protection of tribal economies the exception. Damage to Indian economies, because of the relationship of tribal economy to tribal identity, cannot
be repaired by federal expenditures, even if such expenditures were possible.
As Indian economies suffer, the IRA vision of self-sufficient tribal societies
will become unattainable. The United States Supreme Court, while depriving the tribes of an important route to independence, did not spell out an
alternative course.
Charley Carpenter

